



# WPA3™ Security Considerations

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# Introduction

Part of the Wi-Fi Protected Access® (WPA™) family of technologies, WPA3™-Personal provides next generation security for private Wi-Fi® networks based on a simple password credential. WPA3 raises the bar on Wi-Fi network security. To realize the security benefits available through WPA3, it is important that the implementation guidance in this document be followed. This document covers several areas deserving special mention, as well as recommended implementation considerations.

## WPA3-Personal Recommendations

- Passwords used with WPA3-Personal should be complex enough to not be easily guessable. WPA3-Personal implementations should limit authentication attempts when an implementation identifies an active attack (see Password Strength below).
- Access point (AP) implementations should handle Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) operations on non-privileged processing queues which, if overwhelmed, will not result in a failure of the entire basic service set (BSS) through central processing unit (CPU) resource consumption (see Denial of Service Protection).
- SAE Diffie-Hellman Group implementation recommendations:
  - Must use only Diffie-Hellman groups 15-21; group 19 is mandatory others are optional (see Suitable Diffie-Hellman Groups and Modular Exponential (MODP) Group Timing Side-Channels).
  - Should only offer a Diffie-Hellman group whose strength estimate is greater than or equal to the encryption cipher being offered (see Table 1: Diffie-Hellman Group Suitability  
\*Strength estimate is a maximum value and can be decreased based on entropy estimates (Implementation Guidance for FIPS140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program)
  - Diffie-Hellman Group Downgrade).
- SAE implementations must set the security parameter  $k$  to a value of at least forty (40) per the recommendation in RFC 7664 “Dragonfly Key Exchange” for all groups to prevent timing leaks.
- SAE implementations must avoid differences in code execution that allow side channel information collection through the cache (see Cache-Based Elliptic Curve Side-Channels).
- If WPA3-Personal Transition Mode does not meet the security requirements for a deployment, WPA3-Personal and WPA2™-Personal should be deployed on individual service set identifiers (SSIDs) using unique passwords and logically separated/isolated network segments (see WPA3-Personal Transition Mode).

**Failure to implement these recommendations correctly may expose the vendor implementation to attack and/or compromise the network.**

## Extensible Authentication Protocol Password (EAP-pwd) Recommendations

Although EAP-pwd is not currently part of WPA3, this document covers several areas related to EAP-pwd that deserve special mention, as well as recommended implementation considerations for those who choose to implement it.

While EAP-pwd may be used in enterprise deployments where authentication happens between the supplicant and the EAP-server, the SAE implementation recommendations also apply to EAP-pwd and references to “AP” are replaced by “EAP-server”.

# Security Considerations Detail

## Password Strength

### Recommendation:

Passwords used with WPA3-Personal should be complex enough to not be easily guessable, and WPA3-Personal implementations should limit authentication attempts when an implementation identifies an active attack.

## Summary:

WPA3-Personal replaces the WPA2-Personal Pre-Shared Key (PSK) authentication with SAE. Unlike PSK, SAE is resistant to offline dictionary attacks. The only way for an attacker to learn a password is through repeated active attacks, each of which tests whether a single guess of the password is correct or not. Repeated authentication failures may indicate that an active attack is underway, allowing implementations to respond appropriately, including throttling authentication attempts and/or issuing alerts such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) trap, log message, or others.

The requirement for exceedingly long, random passwords with mixed-case characters and special characters is no longer necessary with WPA3-Personal. Passwords used with WPA3-Personal should be extremely difficult to guess due to the possibility of an active attack; however, the difficulty in guessing a password directly correlates to the security that SAE offers.

To illustrate the benefits that WPA3-Personal affords, consider a password selected randomly from 5,000 possible passwords. The attacker knows this but does not know which password was randomly chosen. With WPA2-Personal an attacker could determine the password through an off-line dictionary attack with a probability of success of 1. With WPA3-personal, the attacker must launch repeated active attacks, guessing a different password each time. The probability of success of the WPA3-Personal attack would only reach 0.5 after 2,500 active attacks. It should be possible to detect such an attack on WPA3-Personal long before the probability of success becomes high.

Implementations of WPA3-Personal should limit authentication attempts for a particular password—identified with an SAE Password Identifier or not—when an active attack is identified. Determination of whether an attack is underway is implementation dependent and left up to the vendor. One possible mitigation strategy may be that the AP temporarily disable a password after a series of unsuccessful authentication attempts. Note that the source medium access control (MAC) address used with failed authentication attempts is irrelevant and should not factor into the decision to disable or limit authentication for a particular password because an attacker can easily change the MAC address between attempts.

## Denial of Service Protection

### Recommendation:

WPA3-Personal implementations should handle SAE operations on non-privileged processing queues which, even if overwhelmed, will not result in a failure of the entire BSS through CPU resource consumption.

### Summary:

An AP performs a significant amount of cryptographic work upon receipt of the first message in an SAE handshake. A denial of service attack can be initiated by flooding the AP with fraudulent messages from fake MAC addresses resulting in the failure of the entire BSS through CPU resource consumption.

SAE defines an anti-clogging cookie response in which the AP statelessly generates a string that is bound to the sender of the message when the AP detects it is under a denial of service attack. An AP may consider itself under a denial of service attack when the number of nascent connections, those in which the first message has been received but not the third message, reaches a threshold. The AP, when in a “cookie demanding” state, will not process the first SAE message unless that message contains a valid cookie bound to the MAC address of the sender.

This technique works against rudimentary and simple packet spraying attacks because the attacker is simply sending random packets and not processing responses. However, this technique does not work if the attacker chooses to receive the AP cookie request and respond with the cookie from the same MAC address. Therefore, SAE does not afford adequate protection against more sophisticated denial of service attacks. WPA3-Personal implementations should handle SAE operations on non-privileged processing queues which, even if overwhelmed, will not result in a failure of the entire BSS through CPU resource consumption.

## Suitable Diffie-Hellman Groups

### Recommendation:

SAE implementations must use only Diffie-Hellman groups 15-21, and group 19 is mandatory.

SAE implementations must set the security parameter  $k$  to a value of at least forty (40) as per the recommendation in RFC 7664 "Dragonfly Key Exchange" for all groups to prevent timing leaks.

### Summary:

SAE performs public key cryptography using named Diffie-Hellman groups. The IKEv1 (RFC 2409) group registry maintained by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) maps the group's complete domain parameter set to a reference number. Not all registered groups are suitable for use with SAE.

The rules used to evaluate the suitability of groups are:

1. No binary elliptic curve (EC2N) groups
2. No groups defined over a prime field (MODP) with a prime less than 3072 bits
3. No groups defined over a prime field (MODP) with a small sub-group of prime order
4. No elliptic curve group with a prime less than 256-bits
5. No elliptic curve group that might expose detectable timing differences when used in conjunction with the SAE.

The following table indicates the recommended groups to be used with SAE. All other groups must not be used with SAE.

Group Number	Description	Strength Estimate*	Suitability
15	3072-bit MODP group	128	Suitable
16	4096-bit MODP group	152	Suitable
17	6144-bit MODP group	176	Suitable
18	8192-bit MODP group	200	Suitable
19	256-bit random ECP group (NIST)	128	Suitable (Mandatory)
20	384-bit random ECP group (NIST)	192	Suitable
21	512-bit random ECP group (NIST)	256	Suitable

Table 1: Diffie-Hellman Group Suitability

\*Strength estimate is a maximum value and can be decreased based on entropy estimates (Implementation Guidance for FIPS140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program)

## Diffie-Hellman Group Downgrade

### Recommendation:

SAE implementations should only offer a Diffie-Hellman group whose strength estimate is greater than or equal to the strength estimate of the encryption cipher being offered.

### Summary:

In SAE, the initiator chooses the group to use and includes the group number in the first message. The responder accepts the group or responds with a message containing an error code indicating group rejection if the responder does not want to use the group. If the group is rejected, the initiator chooses another group and tries again.

This technique opens the protocol to a downgrade attack where an attacker impersonates the AP and responds with a rejection of a stronger group until the client device offers a weak group and then lets the protocol proceed with the real AP.

SAE does not inherently protect against Diffie-Hellman Group Downgrade attacks, however they can be mitigated by not allowing weak groups and only allowing rejections to offer “upgraded” groups.

Suitable Diffie-Hellman groups for use with SAE all generate a key whose strength is appropriate for the default and mandatory-to-implement cipher, AES-CCM-128. While AES-CCM-256 and AES-GCM-256 ciphers may be used with SAE, SAE uses SHA256 for key derivation thereby mitigating, to some extent, the strength benefits afforded by different groups such as group 20 or group 21. SAE implementations should only offer a Diffie-Hellman group whose strength estimate is greater than or equal to the strength estimate of the encryption cipher being offered. See National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication SP 800-56A, Revision 3, April 2018 Appendix D Table 24 and Table 25 for more information.

## MODP Group Timing Side-Channels

### Recommendation:

SAE implementations must disable the use of all MODP groups with a prime less than 3072 bits to prevent side-channel timing attacks.

### Summary:

The password element generation algorithm for MODP groups is affected by timing side-channels, and the obtained information can later be used to recover the password. MODP groups 22, 23, and 24 have a small sub-group and are known to be weak; refer to "Measuring small sub-group attacks against Diffie-Hellman" by Valeta et al, 2017.

See Table 1: Diffie-Hellman Group Suitability in this document for group suitability with SAE and EAP-pwd.

## Cache-Based Elliptic Curve Side-Channels

### Recommendation:

SAE implementations must avoid differences in code execution that allow side channel information collection through the cache.

Two methods exist:

1. Implement SAE in such a way to use constant time operations that use the same memory access pattern regardless of the values derived from the password.
2. Reduce the visibility of side channel information, for instance, by preventing sharing of cache lines between processes if efficiently supported by the hardware architecture.

### Summary:

This vulnerability requires monitoring of cache access patterns on a compromised machine, one running the attacker’s software. The obtained information can later be used to recover the password. The goal is to learn if the quadratic residue (QR) test in the first iteration of the hash to curve algorithm succeeded or not. This information can be used in the offline password partitioning attack to recover the target’s password. The implementation of the hash to curve algorithm for elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) groups does include mitigations against side channel attacks. Those mitigations include performing extra dummy iterations on random data and blinding of the underlying cryptographic calculation of the quadratic residue test. Preventing the installation of malicious software may be an effective additional mitigation approach for some device categories.

## WPA3-Personal Transition Mode

### Recommendation:

If WPA3-Personal Transition Mode does not meet the security requirements for a deployment, WPA3-Personal and WPA2-Personal should be deployed on individual SSIDs using unique passwords and logically separated/isolated network segments.

### Summary:

WPA3-Personal Transition Mode was defined by Wi-Fi Alliance® to minimize user disruption and provide a gradual migration path to WPA3-Personal while maintaining interoperability with WPA2-Personal only devices. Since SAE is a new Wi-Fi authentication protocol and is not backward compatible with PSK, mandating WPA3-Personal only on a BSS would require every client device to support WPA3-Personal, disrupting currently deployed WPA2-Personal only devices. Once WPA3-Personal availability reaches a sufficient level amongst client devices, network owners should disable WPA3-Personal Transition Mode to achieve the full benefits of WPA3-Personal.

WPA3-Personal Transition Mode supports both WPA3-Personal and WPA2-Personal authentication on the same BSS with the same SSID, using the same password. This was done for ease-of-use and because it is not possible to make valid assumptions about user experience across diverse device types, or the security awareness of users, that would ensure a smooth rollout. A trade-off is that the common password of a WPA3-Personal Transition Mode network can be determined by attacking a WPA2-Personal device using a simple offline dictionary attack. The WPA2-Personal attack could be performed passively on a legacy client device that only supports WPA2-Personal, or a more complex active downgrade attack could be performed on a client that supports WPA3-Personal.

The passive attack on legacy WPA2-Personal only client devices is the same as exists with legacy WPA2-Personal only networks. The active attack on an WPA3-Personal client device is complex and gains the attacker little because of the possibility to run the simpler passive attack on legacy clients. An attacker who determines the password can access the network simply by using WPA2-Personal, irrespective of WPA3-Personal. In addition, even after this attack is successful and the attacker determines the password, the clients that connect with WPA3-Personal will still benefit from the forward-secrecy that SAE affords—that is, the traffic encryption keys will still remain unknown even if the password is known. This is not an attack against WPA3-Personal.

If WPA3-Personal Transition Mode does not meet the security requirements for a deployment, WPA3-Personal and WPA2-Personal should be deployed on individual SSIDs using unique passwords and logically separated/isolated network segments; network segmentation strategies and implementations are determined by the vendor. APs must be configured to support the WPA3-Personal only network to benefit from the enhanced security of SAE.

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